
Efforts to establish a code of conduct between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for the South China Sea stalled at their 2026 summit in Manila, with key disputes unresolved despite negotiation progress. Philippine Foreign Secretary Theresa Lazaro reported that around 80% of the text had been negotiated, yet fundamental disagreements prevented a final agreement, according to information released by analysts and experts.
The South China Sea remains a strategically vital and contentious waterway. Rich in fishing grounds, possible oil and gas reserves, and serving as a major global shipping route, the region is also marked by overlapping territorial claims, particularly under China’s expansive Nine-Dash Line claim that conflicts with claims from the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei.
Challenges in Defining the Code’s Scope and Legal Status
A major point of contention concerns whether the code of conduct should be legally binding or remain a voluntary set of guidelines. Political scientist Andreas Ufen from the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) noted that China has little incentive to accept binding commitments that could constrain its regional ambitions. Vietnam, for example, seeks to include the Paracel Islands within the code’s geographical coverage, while China rejects such inclusion, illustrating the territorial disputes complicating negotiations.
Additional controversies involve defining what constitutes an “incident” under the code, such as whether coast guard uses of water cannons or supply vessel blockades should be regulated. Felix Heiduk from the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) emphasized that these issues are critical to the code’s potential effectiveness.
Divisions Within ASEAN and Divergent Interests
ASEAN’s internal divisions further impede unified progress. Countries like the Philippines and Vietnam take a stronger stance against China’s claims, while Malaysia and Indonesia adopt more cautious approaches. Cambodia and Laos, with close economic ties to Beijing and no territorial claims in the sea, often align differently. ASEAN’s consensus decision-making process allows any member to block agreement, making negotiation outcomes fragile.
Experts suggest China prefers bilateral negotiations with individual ASEAN countries to avoid facing a unified regional front. The strategic implication is that China maintains leverage by keeping tensions unresolved while avoiding binding limitations on its maritime actions.
Military Build-Up and Regional Security Concerns
Amid the diplomatic stalemate, South China Sea nations have been investing in naval modernization. China’s naval expenditures surpass all regional countries combined. Vietnam has acquired quiet Russian submarines, the Philippines operates former U.S. Coast Guard cutters, and Indonesia and Malaysia procure warships from European shipyards. Singapore operates advanced stealth ships. Meanwhile, the U.S. Seventh Fleet, the largest forward-deployed U.S. naval force, continues its presence in the Pacific region, including the USS Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier stationed in Japan.
Outlook on Future Negotiations
The next round of talks is planned under Singapore’s ASEAN chairmanship in 2027. Analysts caution that without China’s willingness to accept binding regulations and ASEAN’s ability to reach consensus, the code of conduct may remain a non-binding declaration of intent. Partial agreements focusing on specific areas like crisis communication or maritime environment protection have been recommended as intermediate steps toward building trust and cooperation. However, experts warn that even a signed code of conduct will not resolve the fundamental territorial disputes that persist in the South China Sea.






